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13 August 1944, 
Operational Report
Commanding Officer,
1st Polish Armoured Division
Fighting During the Period from 
7-12 August 1944
MAP REF: 1:50,000 Caen Falaise
Sheets 7F/2 and 7F/6.
Organization of Fighting
On 7 August 1944 at 0500 hours 1st Polish 
Armoured Division became attached to and at the 
disposal of 2nd Canadian Corps (Commanding 
Officer Lieutenant-General Simonds) which 
included 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions, 
4th Cdn Armd Div, and 51st Highland Division.
Task of 2 Cdn Corps
To attack in the general direction of Falaise and 
to break open the hinge S [south] of Caen, then 
to exploit the use of 4 Cdn Armd Div on Falaise 
and 1 Pol Armd Div on the crossings of the River 
Dives in a South-Easterly direction.
Task of 1 Polish Armd Div
To by-pass the 51 (H) Div. To attack and seize the 
area of Hills 170 and 159, N [north] of Falaise and 
from there to carry out recce [reconnaissance] 
patrols in the arc made by the Falaise - Argentan 
(included) and the Mont-Boint (1446) – Conde-
sur-Ifs (1952) rds (excluded).
Intention
Task to be executed in two phases:
First Phase: The Armd Bde [Brigade] to seize first 
objective (area S of Estrée la Campagne and the 
Hill 140 (1347)). Rifle Bde was to form a pivot 
in the area of Cauvicourt.
Second Phase: Rifle Bde was to change over with 
the Armd Bde, which was to attack the second 
objective (area of Hills 170 & 159 N of Falaise).
Total operation to be covered by reinforced 10 
Mounted Rifle Regt from the E [east] in order to 
maintain closest contact with 4 Cdn Armd Div 
in the W [west].
The 1st Polish Armoured 
Division in Normandy
Major-General Stanislaw Maczek
Editor’s note:  The 1st Polish Armoured Division fought side-by-side with the Canadians during the 
Normandy Campaign. The Division was formed in England in early 1942 mainly from Poles who 
had fled the German occupation of their country in 1939. On 30 July 1944 the Division arrived 
in Normandy where it was placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds’ 2nd 
Canadian Corps.  Its first introduction to battle came on 7 August during the battles south of Caen. 
The report reproduced below constitutes the afteraction report of the 1st Polish Armoured Division 
for it operations in Normandy. This report forms the basis of many accounts of the Division and 
deserves to be read in its original, unedited form.
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Method
10 Mounted Rifle Regt less one sqn, reinforced 
by one A [Anti] Tk [Tank] Bty [Battery] SP 17-
pdr received the task to reconnoitre and cover 
the left flank of Div, according to special order, 
after leading regts of Armd Bde had crossed the 
rd Bretteville-le Rabet – St. Sylvain. Further, 
execution of marching orders as Attack Order 
No.1. 
Development of Military Operations
Night march on 7/8 August 1944 and activity 
on 8 August 1944
The march was executed by two columns from 
former positions:
10 Armd Cavalry Bde (from area Buchot)
3 Rifle Bde (from area Magny)
Arty (from area Meuvaines)
Div Tps and Div HQ (from area Sommervieu)
Leading Bde - 10 Armd Cavalry Bde in complete 
formation:
 1 Mech Arty Regt.
 One A Tk Bty
 One AA Bty, less two troops
 8 Rifle Bn from 3 Rifle Bde
Major-General Stanislaw Maczek, commander of 1st Polish Armoured Division, and his staff talking to war correspondents 
at Amblie, Normandy, 7 August 1944.  From left to right: L.S.B. Shapiro, North American Newspaper Alliance; Ralph 
Allen, Globe & Mail; and J.A.M. Cook, Winnipeg Free Press; Captain T.A. Wysocki, Colonel K. Dworak and Maczek.
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 10 Light Med Coy
 10 Sap Coy
Att to Bde, 22 Brit Dragoons, equiped with Anti-
mine tanks (Crab-type).
On 7 Aug 44, at 1800 hours the columns 
were formed; at 0230 hours the fwd [forward] 
elements of the bde reached the start line. The 
bde, marching on the Red axis was followed by 
the Adv Div HQ and 3 Rifle Bde, less 8 Rifle Bn 
[Battalion], reinf by: 2 Mech [Mechanized] Arty 
[Artillery] Regt [Regiment]; two A Tk Btys; one 
AA [Anti-Aircraft] Bty 11 Coy Engrs [Engineers] 
(less one platoon); 11 Medical Coy.
Div HQ marched as fourth echelon and 
Quartermaster Group as fifth echelon.
By 0630 hours the leading elements of 10 
Armd Cav Bde reached the designated area – 
the bridges S of Caen. 3 Rifle Bde reached the 
bridges between 1300 and 1400 hours, the Div 
HQ between 1400 and 1500 hours.
The route was traced and controlled by Polish 
and British Traffic Control.
During the march tps [troops] encountered 
several difficulties, namely: poor roads for 
vehs [vehicles], clouds of dust which rendered 
forward cars invisible to the drivers, in a drive 
without lights, rds so narrow that only jeeps and 
motorcycles could overtake.
Generally speaking the march was efficiently 
executed – in spite of an exceptional concentration 
of troops in this area.
The distance covered in the march was nearly 30 
kilometres. The 10 Armd Cav Bde reaches Bras 
by 0800 hours. After breakfast, the echelons A 1 
and A 2 were left in Bras and the Bde regrouped 
for the march to the forming up place.
Here the 22 Brit Dragoons joined the bde. The 
attack was to be preceded by the bombardment 
by 21 A Gp Air Force, after which an arty barrage 
was to be laid on enemy positions. At 1330 
hours, the Air Force started the bombardment 
but, probably by mistake, instead of bombing the 
area of Cauvicourt–St. Sylvain, bombed the area 
S of Caen, just as the Div HQ, as fourth echelon 
arrived at its appointed place.
As a result of this bombardment, the Cdn AGRA 
suffered most, losing a great number of men 
and much eqpt, but our AA Arty also lost 44 
men (killed and wounded). The situation was 
extremely difficult as the area was packed with 
various munition dumps which exploded for 40 
minutes after the bombing as a result of fires 
caused. At 1335 hours 24 Lancers and 2 Tk 
Regt, each reinforced by one sqn [squadron] of 
Dragoons, one sqn of Crabs, and one platoon of 
Engineers, started the attack as leading regts. At 
1425 hours, 2 Tk Regt was stopped in attack by 
twenty German tks, probably of German Tiger 
type and Mk IV, operating from area 108556.
24 Lancers were under enemy arty fire. The 
CO 10 Armd Cavalry Bde required arty on the 
discovered targets.
1st Polish Armoured Division
Divisional Command Group
Headquarters
No.4 Liaison HQ (British)
10th Mounted Rifles Regiment (reconnaissance)
10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade
1st Armoured Regiment
2nd Armoured Regiment
24th Lancer Regiment
10th Dragoon Regiment (motor battalion)
3rd Rifle Brigade
Podhole Rifle Battalion, 1st (Highland) Battalion
8th Rifle Battalion
9th Rifle Battalion
Divisional Artillery
1st Motorized Artillery Regiment
2nd Motorized Artillery Regiment
1st Anti-Tank Regiment
1 Anti-Aircraft Regiment
Divisional Engineers
10th Engineer Company
11th Engineer Company
1st Bridging Platoon
1st Field Park Company
1st Signals Battalion
Supply and Transport Troops
Medical Troops
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At 1450 hours, two Arty Regts opened fire with 
good results. At 1520 hours contact with 4 Cdn 
Armd Div was established at the co-ordinate 
082558. In that time, 2 Tk Regt fell into a very 
difficult situation, its flank being menaced by 
German tks. The CO Bde, arrived with help, 
covering the flank with 2 Sqn, 10 Mounted Rifle 
Regt and with one A Tk Bty.
Our arty, very efficiently and 
quickly supported 2 Tk Regt.
After all day fighting, the armd 
regts set out for the night bivouac. 
3 Rifle Bde took over the sector 
and protected it for the night (the 
Bde was to execute a night attack, 
which was not realized).
The losses inflicted on the enemy 
by 10 Armd Cavalry Bde in this 
day were:
Prisoners – 1 offr, 105 ORs
Tanks – 1 MK IV, 5 Mk V destroyed 
or damaged.
2 – 88 mm A Tk guns destroyed.
1 – 75 mm gun damaged
4 – 20 mm guns destroyed, 3 
damaged.
1 – 105 mm gun destroyed
6 – mortars (15 cm) destroyed
7 – Hy MG destroyed.
2 – Hy MG damaged.
General Remarks concerning 8 
August 44
The ground was difficult for an 
attack by the armour, having 
several small woods and high 
hedges. In spite of fairly distant 
horizons, the ground was very 
favourable for the enemy’s A Tk 
defence.
The enemy was not sufficiently 
neutralized by our own Air Force 
and arty, so that the bde could 
attack without heavy losses 
(unfortunately the air force passed 
through our own forces, destroying 
not only a part of the arty, but also 
the ammunition dumped for AGRA).
There was a constant threat to the left flank, 
which will be henceforth a menace to the div ops 
and my permanent worry.
The Crab regt was almost unemployed, since we 
did not find any minefields.
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9 August 1944 – During the night of 8/9 August, 
3 Rifle Bde prepared itself for the attack, but did 
not carry it out, as the enemy withdrew, and after 
only short fighting, reached the SE boundaries 
of woods Robertmesnil, taking 
48 prisoners. Our losses were 
insignificant. At 0700 hours, 10 
Armd Cavalry Bde were moved to 
new area (N Cramesnil) 083570. 
Between 0900 – 1000 hours, a 
conference of COs was held and 
the orders for a further move 
were given.
24 Lancers were given the task 
of seizing the grove 1152 – La 
Croise and of the wood S 1249. 1 
Tk Regt plus one A Tk Bty had to 
take 140 (130478) Cauvicourt–
Rénemesnil and cover itself by 
the A Tk Bty from E. 2 Tk Regt 
was in res behind 24 Lancers. 
10 Dragoons between 2 Tk Regt 
and 24 Lancers had the task 
consolidating the ground seized 
by the tk regts.
Ar ty  was  to  suppor t  the 
operations of the bde as far as 
the R. Laison. Engrs with the 
reserve regt, were at the disposal 
of the CO 10 Armd Cavalry Bde.
Starting hour 1100 hours. 
10 Mounted Rifle Regt, which very 
successfully and courageously 
reconnoitred St. Sylvain, was 
released by 8 Rifle Bn, which 
received the order to occupy 
and to organize the defence of 
St. Sylvain, but when it was discovered that St. 
Sylvain was occupied by a strong enemy force 
with the support of hy mortars and arty, the task 
of capturing it was given to the Mountain Rifle 
Top: Members of the 2nd Armoured 
Regiment waiting in the concentration 
area, Cintheaux, 8 August 1944.
Middle: A Sherman V of the 1st 
Armoured Regiment in an assembly 
area, August 1944.
Bottom: Anti-Aircraft troop with the 
forward command element of the 24th 
Lancer Regiment, 8 August 1944.
Photos courtesy John R. Grodzinski
5
Maczek: 1st Polish Armoured Division
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006
56
Bn, which reinforced 8 Rifle Bn. 
Between 1220 and 1255 hours, 1 Tk Regt reached 
the W outlets of Cauvicourt and 24 Lancers the 
grove 110520.
In the foreground appeared several times tks of 
Tiger type, numbering 10 to 15 against which the 
regts were fighting suffering loses.
About 1600 hours 1 Tk Regt captured Hill 84, 
distinguishing itself in this fighting.
24 Lancers seized the NW boundary of la Croix, 
1149.
For the night, 9 Rifle Bn took over Cauvicourt 
from 10 Armd Cavalry Bde. At 1930 hours, the 
Mountain Rifle Bn started to attack St. Sylvain. 
The action was preceded by heavy bombardment 
by arty and Air Force. By 2200 hours St. Sylvain 
was occupied up to the area incl the church, and 
by 2400 hours St. Martin de Bois was also taken. 
The enemy losses were:
Prisoners – 3 offrs, 77 ORs.
Destroyed – 4 tks Mk IV, 1 Tk Mk V and 1 Tk 
Mk VI.
Damaged – 1 tk Mk VI
Destroyed  – 3 75 mm guns
Damaged  – 3 75 mm guns
Destroyed  – 4 22 mm A Tk guns, 8 15cm 
Mortars, 2 Hy MGs.
During the day of 9 Aug, I received the order to 
hand over the sector to 51 (H) Div, and to move 
my div.
10 August 1944: After midnight, began the relief 
of the Mountain Rifle Bn by the units of 51 (H) 
Div. The Mountain Rifle Bn moved to the region 
of Rénemesnil, 9 Rifle Bn, which passed under 
the comd of C.O. 10 Armd Cavalry Bde moved 
to the area of Soignolles.
10 Dragoons carried out a night attack on Estrées 
la Campagne, receiving with 9 Rifle Bn a task to 
reconnoitre.
At 1055 hours the enemy launched a counter-
attack from the area 140525 against 9 Rifle 
Bn. The counter-attack was repulsed. During 
this action the A Tk Bty distinguished itself. 
At 1530 hours the C.O., 3 Rifle Bde received 
the order to attack the area of hill 140111 (E 
and S of Estrées la Campagne) and to seize 
the brhead [bridgehead] on the R Laison at 
Montboint and Rouvres. Simultaneously, 9 Rifle 
Bn attacked, seized and maintained the horizon 
E of Soignolles.
At 1520 hours, another German counter-attack 
developed on the spot height 83 (128500). It was 
repulsed with the help of AGRA fire.
At night, the situation of the leading units was E of 
Soignolles and Estrées la Campagne. During the 
day of 10 Aug, 9 Rifle Bn worked well, repulsing 
several attacks of the enemy and maintaining its 
positions. The Dragoons also did well, and had 
excellent support from the A Tk units.
11 August 1944: On 11 Aug 44, the div remained 
in its assigned area and maintained Soignolles 
and Estrées la Campagne.
During the day, I received orders to attack and clr 
up with one bn the whole wood of Quesnay. The 
Corps Comd, decided later that this area should 
be attacked by 3 Cdn Inf Div. I received instead, 
the task of forming a special group for operational 
M-10s of the 1st Anti-Tank Regiment firing onto German positions, August 1944.
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reconnoitring of the areas la Bû sur Rouvres, 
Ernes and Ifs-sur-Laison. This reconnaissance 
was to be carried out for the Corps.
During the day, the Germans launched several 
counter-attacks against Estrées la Campagne and 
Soignolles, all of which were repulsed, and the 
tps maintained their positions.
12 Aug 44: (until 1200 hours). At night units of 
1 Pol Armd Div were relieved by 3 Cdn Inf Div, 
in area Estrées la Campagne and Soignolles. The 
relief was completed at 0500 hours.
The Div passed to the res in Cramesnil la Bruyére.
3 Rifle Bde was in the woods S of Cramesnil 
090555 with 1 A Tk Regt, (less two Btys) and 11 
Engr Coy. 10 Armd Cav Bde in area St. Sylvain 
(W) Cauvicourt – Rénemesnil. Div HQ unchanged 
081571. Recce Group of Major Maciejowski (10 
Mounted Rifles, 1 A Tk Bty SP and one Mech 
Arty Bty SP) reconnoitred La Bû sur Rouvres 
and area N and S of this locality. Between 1100 
and 1230 hours the recce group established that 
the enemy is occupying La Bû sur Rouvres by inf 
(987 Inf Regt) and supposedly also by A Tk guns 
on the flanks of this formation (2 88 mm guns). 
The group received fire from two to three German 
tks in a hull-down position from area 150508. 
Another sqn was under A Tk fire. As a result of 
this fire, four tks were lost (set on fire), one tk 
damaged on a mine. At 1200 hours the recce gp 
still reconnoitres.
General Characteristics of 1 Polish Armd 
Divsion’s Operations During the Period 7-12 
Aug 44.
Marches to the battle:
(a) The first factor to note was the great 
accumulation of Allied tps operating in Normandy. 
From this fact resulted immense difficulty in the 
execution of movements and in the disposition 
of tps and rear units in assigned areas. There 
was also the menace of the enemy Air Force and 
arty fire. (Unfortunately, equally from the Allied 
Air Force).
After leaving Caen, the div moved on certain 
sectors cross-country. The CO Div Engrs was 
forced repeatedly to prepare and maintain the 
rds.
(b) The ops resembled the West Front fighting 
in the war of 1918; but the attacking forces had 
more liberty of action, considering the strong 
superiority of our Air Force and arty.
(c) The ground was not quite as shown by maps 
of France which have been supplied, having more 
woods and particularly bushes, which was very 
cunningly exploited by the enemy. 
With his perfect camouflage, it made a great 
difference to us.
(d) The enemy operated with individual battle 
groups (Kampfgruppe) composed by inf, A Tk 
arty, hy Inf weapons, and a few tks of Tiger, 
Panther or Mk IV type. These groups held the 
regions suitable for A Tk defence and their 
strength and composition varied according to 
the size of these regions.
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Above:  A SP 40 mm AA (Bofors) Morris-Commerical C9/B 
of the 1st Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Normandy, August 1944
Right:  Officers of the 1st Motorized Artillery Regiment 
make a final review of plans, August 1944.
Photos courtesy John R. Grodzinski
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1 Pol Armd Div fought with the following identified 
enemy units during the whole period 7-12 Aug; 
the 89 Inf Div (arrived direct from Norway five 
days before our engagement). In the days 8-10 
Aug with 12 SS Panzer Div “Hitlerjugend”, with 
101 Hy Tk Bn, belonging to the 1 SS Corps (at 
Robertmesnil) and with the 272 Inf Div (at Bû 
sur Rouvres).
In the days 10 and 11 Aug, with the group 
“Waldmuller” (at Robertmesnil) and with 85 Inf 
Div (which arrived recently from Germany and on 
the day of 11 Aug was identified on our sector).
The enemy fought stubbornly. The SS units are 
fighting particularly well. Weak fighters were the 
inf of the 89 Inf Div, but they were successfully 
supported by the mortars and inf guns, as well 
as by single tks. 
(e) All subordinate units fought well, sacrificing 
themselves. The losses in proportion to the 
enemy strength and the progress made (10 
kilometres of heavy struggle) are not important.
Captured Localities: Cramesnil–La Bruyére (8 
Aug); Cauvicourt (9 Aug); Robertmesnil (9 Aug); 
St. Sylvain (10 Aug); St Martin de Bois (9 Aug); 
Soignolles (10 Aug); Estrées la Campagne (10 
Aug).
On 11 Aug, all objectives have been maintained. 
On 12 Aug a special group reconnoitred La Bû 
sur Rouvres.
(f) Losses
By 1200 hours 12 Aug 44, the following losses 
were recorded:
121 killed (incl 11 offrs)
499 wounded (incl 57 offrs)
36 missing (incl 5 offrs)
Total 656
Soldiers from the 1st Polish Armoured Division talk 
with a French civilian walking away with what she 
could salvage from her house in Normandy, August 
1944.
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In proportion to the strength of the div, the losses 
were not too heavy, but the specialists, chiefly tk 
crews, lost are difficult to replace.
(g) Losses of Equipment
The losses in armour (mostly from direct hits 
or set on fire): total number 66. They have been 
replaced with the exception of ten tks destroyed. 
There are also destroyed 5 A Tk guns SP (4 - 
3-inch and 1 – 17-pdr); 5 6-pdr A Tk guns; 1 
25-pdr gun SP and 1 25-pdr gun tractor drawn.
(h) The Booty
Up to 12 Aug 44 at 1200 hours, the number of 
prisoners taken and recorded in Div HQ was: 
4 offrs and 175 ORs. Apart from these nearly 
250 prisoners were directed straight to the 
British posts. A total of 429 prisoners. Among 
the recorded POW were 1 offr and 9 ORs (incl 
7 Poles), 85 Inf Div; 67 ORs (incl 4 Poles), 89 
Inf Div; 15 prisoners (incl 3 Poles), 272 Inf Div; 
3 prisoners, 12 SS Panzer Div; 3 offrs (among 
whom was Major Von Fischbach, OC 1193 Bty 
of Coastal Arty, now 2 i/c of the group), Group 
Waldmuller.
Equipment: destroyed or put out of action:
5 – tks Mk IV
6 – tks Mk V
2 – tks Mk VI
2 – 88 mm guns
7 – 75 mm guns
1 – 105 mm gun
14 – 15 cm mortars
7 – MGs
4 – 22 mm A Tk guns.
(i) I have always maintained that the morale of 
the soldiers belonging to 1 Pol Armd Div is good, 
but now, after this first period of fighting, I must 
stress that the morale of the units, as well as 
other services, is even better than very good.
(j) Description of Some Actions
Cromwell tanks of the 10th Mounted Rifles, the divisional reconnaissance regiment waiting to advance.
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1 Tk Regt – distinguished itself in the battle for 
Rénemesnil on 9 Aug. About 1200 hours the 
Regt received a hy arty and mortar fire in the 
neighbourhood of the church. In the area of Hill 
84 (S Rénemesnil) Tigers appeared, with the sp 
of very well working arty. The regt, in an attack, 
took Hill 84, but on the S slope was stopped by 
very fierce A Tk defence. At 1300 hours CO Regt 
decided to attack Hill 111 (along the axis 84 
Chemin Hausse).  The second sqn captured the 
hill. The enemy put up a very hy fire of mortars, 
arty, and A Tk guns. In this op the regt suffered 
quite hy losses, namely: 3 offr killed (incl the 2 
i/c) and 10 ORs; 4 offrs wounded and 11 ORs; 1 
off missing and 7 ORs.
During the action on Hill 111 the regt freed from 
the Germans about 100 Cdn soldiers, who had 
been without food and ammunition for two days. 
The captured prisoners confessed that the attack 
demoralized the enemy inf garrison.
9 Rifle Bn – were exposed in Soignolles to 
German fire and counter-attacks. They kept their 
ground in spite of several enemy counter-attacks 
and notwithstanding losses of 20 killed and 
nearly 120 wounded, showed a very high morale.
10 Dragoons – held Estrées la Campagne (SE 
outlets) during 11 Aug under a heavy fire of 
coupled mortars. In spite of losses and over-
fatigue morale of this regt was excellent, which I 
could personally establish.
The A Tk Regt – all btys competed with each 
other in stoutness and bravery as well as in good 
firing. The relatively high amt of destroyed or 
damaged enemy eqpt is to be attributed chiefly 
to their good action. 
10 Mounted Rifle Regt – worked all the time 
with sacrifice and persistence, demoralizing the 
enemy. According to the statements of prisoners, 
as a result of this regts action the Germans in 
La Bû sur Rouvres suffered losses necessitating 
their release by tps from Ernes.
Div HQ, with supply tps and wkshops, fell into the 
range of bomber Air Force, probably American, 
S of Caen on 8 Aug, which by mistake bombed 
this area. In spite of the large accumulation of 
arty, Air Force and inf munitions deposited in the 
area designated for us, and the explosions which 
lasted 40 minutes, and in spite of AA Arty losses, 
all endured the fire very praiseworthily and no 
missing were reported.
The Div passed through their baptism of battle 
very well and bravely, and one feels one can rely 
on these soldiers.
General Remarks:
(1) The op was not executed according to plan 
of the Corps Comd, as the 51 (H) Div did not 
capture on the first day all their objectives. In 
consequence, 1 Pol Armd Div could not by-pass 
51 (H) Div and make an adv according to plan just 
after the air bombardment of the hill S Estrées 
la Campagne 140, but was forced to help 51 (H) 
Div in capturing their objectives. The mistakes 
of our own Bomber Air Force were the reason.
(2) The enemy gained time to recover, not having 
been sufficiently neutralized by the arty and Air 
Force.
(3) 1 Pol Armd Div was obliged to execute several 
short attacks in succession, typical for inf ops. 
It had not the chance to take advantage of an inf 
action, which is the proper work of an armd div.
(4) 1 Pol Armd Div fell into the fire of enemy tks 
of Tiger type, and into A Tk fire before reaching 
so called “Bombline”, where it was brought by 
the British Traffic Control, and where it had not 
the right of decision.
The op started, however, without any friction, 
thanks to valiant action by 2 A Tk Regt and 24 
Lancers, which immediately deployed, inflicting 
losses on the enemy and forcing him to retreat. 
They themselves, however, suffered likewise fairly 
considerable losses, especially in offrs and hy 
losses in eqpt.
* * * * *
Fighting During the Period
from 12-22 August 1944.
The Closing of the Trun Pocket.
Hill 259 Hordouseaux (3333)
Hill 240 Ecorches (4258)
Hill 252 and 262 Coudehard (4455) (so called 
Maczuga – the Mace)
Chambois (4051-4152).
(a) Relief (12 Aug)
(b) Regrouping E of R Laise (14 Aug) and night 
fighting for Aisy and Potigny (night of 14-15 Aug)
11
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(c) Race for the crossings, their capture and the 
occupation of brheads on the R Dives at Jort and 
L’Homme Couliboef (15, 16 Aug)
(d) Assault from brheads against Trun (16 Aug)
(e) Ops for closing of the Trun pocket (night of 
16/17 Aug)
(f) Diversion on Les Champeaux (18 Aug)
(g) Capture of Chambois and the Mace (Maczuga). 
The estab of contact with Americans at Chambois 
and with 4 Cdn Armd Div in the area of Ecorches.
(h) Battle of the Mace (Maczuga) with penetrating 
German Armd Corps (18 – 22 Aug).
1. Task of 1 Pol Armd Div
The Div got the task of regrouping itself for the 
ops on the crossing of the R Dives.
To attack and capture the crossings on the R 
Dives at Jort.
To org the brheads on the R Dives.
To occupy the hills 159 and 259.
To attack and seize Trun.
General Characteristics of the Fighting
1. The Enemy
(a) The enemy is surprised and misled by the 
recent ops,
(b) He finds himself in a pocket, which must 
be closed,
(c) The strength of the enemy is estimated to 
include several of the higher formations, as much 
as 50% of armoured units.
(d) The enemy will fight desperately and 
valiantly in an attempt to break out of the trap 
(particularly the SS and Panzer units).
The decisive Factors of the success of the op were:
(a) The speed of capturing the crossings on the 
R Dives.
(b) The strength of the two pincers which should 
close the breach
(c) The equality of speed of the Polish div and 
their neighbors
(d) The superiority in arty and Air Force
(e) The dry weather (rds)
2. Own Forces
The losses (656 killed, wounded and missing, 
as given in the battle-report No.1) have not 
influenced the op ability of the div to such a 
degree that the task could not be fulfilled.
The spirit of the tps was excellent, the 
stubbornness even higher than in the first 
phase of the fighting. The supplement of men 
were incorporated and the eqpt was replenished 
(except 10 Shermans for the regts of 10 Armd Cav 
Bde and 2 Cromwells for 10 Mounted Rifle Regt).
The fatigue caused by the fighting was great, but 
was forgotten in the pride at the results achieved. 
The relief as well as the regrouping E of the R 
Laise, was accompanied efficiently and in proper 
time.
An unexpected mishap, however, was the second 
bombardment by our own Air Force on the 
afternoon of 14 Aug, which resulted in 204 cas, 
namely: 1 offr, 47 ORs killed, 103 ORs wounded 
and 53 ORs missing.
The rigidity of the control of the bombing ops 
(from London) made it, as a result, impossible 
to stop it when once started. It lasted two hours. 
The yellow smoke was of no use, because of the 
clouds caused by the first released bombs.
3. The Ground
Features and cover.
Between the R Laise and R Dives – flat and cut 
up with many small plantations and bushes. 
They made natural camouflage for the enemy. 
The armour could be moved only very carefully 
and hence very slowly.
To the E of the R Dives, more or less, on the 
vertical co-ordinate 30, and in the corridor 
of Trun between the woods of de Gouffern (6 
kilometres S of Trun) and the wooded expanse 
to the E of the river, the ground rises, passing 
to outstanding hills with a difference of altitude 
running to 100 meters in 3 kilometres.
This ground was rather more difficult for tk 
ops than the previous area, but not impossible, 
particularly in dry and good weather. 
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The ground lying farther to the W was more 
wooded and hilly, and not suitable at all for 
manoeuvring by larger groups of armour. 
The obstacle which it was necessary to master 
was the R Dives with important crossings in: 
St. Pierre sur Dives (for 51 (H) Div), Jort (for 
1 Pol Armd Div), Morteaux–Couliboeuf (for 4 
Cdn Armd Div); besides the other obstacles to 
the movement of tks, was the N basin of the R. 
Dives with a SW direction, namely, Radon Du 
Ravin Des Hautes; Radon Rau; R de Neauphie 
and R de Fontbec.
The following hills comprised the barrier 
closing the corridor of Trun; 159 (289365); 259 
(332346); the area of hills 137, Hordoseaux and 
the region of Ecorches; the hills 250, 240, 252, 
262 the area Coudehard (the pommel of the Mace 
“Maczuga”); 262 region of Mont Ormel (the stock 
of the Mace “Maczuga”).
4. Communications
(a) Enemy – he would try to break through at all 
costs under cover of his armour or if no other 
possibility, with his armour only.
(b) Task – to occupy speedily and hold, the 
crossings on the R Dives (for 1 Pol Armd Div in 
Jort).
To capture the hills 159 and 259 as a basis for the 
action to the S, especially on Trun and Chambois.
To attack Trun, take and hold it.
To block the enemy’s retreat from Trun by 
capturing and holding the area of hills Horoseaux 
258259 and Ecorche 240 and from Chambois, by 
capturing and holding the area of hills Coudehard 
262, 252 and the hill Mont Ormel 262.
To block the E rd from Chambois (the task of 
the other Army).
5. The General Course of Ops
14 August 1944: The regrouping on the E from 
the R Laise was carried out by 14 Aug, whilst 10 
Dragoons reconnoitred the locality and the woods 
of Quesnay, 8 Rifle Bn Aisy and Potigny, and 9 
Rifle Bn Fontaine le Pin.
In the night of 14/15 Aug, 9 Rifle Bn, by 2400 
hours, had taken Fontaine le Pin and by 0700 
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hours of 15 Aug, had capture the Hill 206, taking 
there 26 prisoners of 85 Inf Div.
8 Rifle Bn, by 0700 hours, had taken Aisy and 
by 0900 hours had captured Potigny, taking also 
prisoners.
Simultaneously with the ops of these bns, 24 
Lancers shot up and captured three tks, 2 
Panthers and 1 Mk IV. Ten prisoners from 12 SS 
Panzer Div taken.
15 August 1944 – The race for the crossings 
on the R Dives and the capture of the crossings 
in Jort.
The div started at 1100 hours in two columns, 
getting permission to pass over the highway 
Caen–Falaise at two points. Right column on 
Rouvres–Sassy–Jort; and the left column on Bout 
de Haut–Vendeuvre-Morières.
The whole was preceded by 10 Mounted Rifles, 
which reconnoitred the crossings and after their 
daring capture, went on to Courcy.
The river was reached and the crossings taken 
at night. The enemy defended them furiously in 
Jort, especially in the area of the rlwy station and 
in a small wood W of the station.
10 Mounted Rifles, with A Tk bty SP, destroyed in 
this action two tks Mk V and captured one tk Mk 
V (co-ordinates 222452 and 219449). Moreover, 
they destroyed four A Tk guns including two 88 
mm (218469, 219449 and 234451). They also 
put out of action a six gun tp, taking 5 guns 
on the position (one was damaged). Prisoners 
numbering 120 were taken from the 272 and 
85 Inf Divs.
At Vendeuvre the crossing had been captured by 
1745 hours.
3 Rifle Bde was ordered to occupy the bridgeheads 
on the R Dives.
10 Mounted Rifle Regt plus one squadron 10 
Dragoons plus one A Tk bty SP have the task 
of reconnoitring on Courcy–Louvagny. The 
whole arty plus one Med Regt RA to support the 
formation at the brhead. The Engrs are building 
a bridge at Jort, clring minefields, repairing rds 
and organizing crossing points. 
During the night, 3 Rifle Bde occupied and 
prepared the brheads on the R Dives. 
16 August 1944 – The attack from bridgeheads 
to the south.
The attack was carried out by 10 Armd Cav 
Bde less one tk regt, reinf by 8 Rifle Bn from 
Vendeuvre. At that time 3 Rifle Bde less 8 Rifle 
Bn held the brheads in Jort (1 Mountain Rifle 
Bn) and Morières (9 Rifle Bn) reinforced by 1 Tk 
Regt, which reconnoitred in the direction of the 
woods of Courcy. 
The attack was carried out in two columns: Right 
column, 24 Lancers plus 10 Dragoons plus one 
A Tk Bty (comd Major Kanski and after he was 
wounded Major Zgorzelski) on the way 24-39 
L’Homme Coulibeouf–Barou. Left Column, 2 Tk 
Regt plus 8 Rifle Bn plus one A Tk Bty on Barou.
The whole Polish Arty SP the attack from the 
area of Sassy and the Brit arty from the area N 
of Rouvres. 
At 2100 hours Barou was captured and the rd 
from Morteaux-Coulibeouf–Barou cut. Morteaux 
was still in enemy hands, as the Cdn Div did not 
manage to take the crossing. Prisoners taken 
were from 1053 and 1054 Grenadier Regts.
17 August 1944 – The Op of closing the Trun 
Gap.
10 Mounted Rifle Regt plus one A Tk Bty was 
withdrawn for the night 16/17 Aug to reserve 
and got for 17 Aug the task of reconnoitring in 
direction of Trun. By 0930 hours this regt stated 
that the enemy columns were moving to the E on 
the highway Crocy – Trun.
10 Armd Cav Bde, which as ordered to attack 
the hills 159 and 259, attacked from Barou, 
captured Norry-en-Auge, and took 2 offrs and 
22 ORs prisoner, of 21 Panzer Div.
By 1700 hours the group of Lt.Col. Koszutski (2 
Tk Regt, 8 Rifle Bn and 1 A Tk Bty) had taken 
the Hill 259 (381346) and the group of Major 
Zgorzelksi (24 Lancers and 10 Dragoons) the 
hill 310360.
More prisoners were taken, numbering 1 offr 
and 84 ORs, from 12 SS Panzer Div, 85 Inf Div 
and 271 Inf Div.
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At 1750 hours the Corps Comd, arrived with the 
order of the Army Group Comd to take Chambois 
that same night. At that time also Trun was to be 
taken by 4 Cdn Armd Div. 
Although the tps were extremely exhausted, as 1 
Pol Armd Div had been fighting as a frontal wedge 
strictly speaking without co-operation of the right 
and left forces and bearing the whole burden of 
what proved later to be a huge weight, the Div 
Comd assigned to Lt.-Col. Koszutski’s group the 
task of an immediate stroke at Chambois, which 
should have started by 1930 hours. A further 
plan of Div Comd was to block the exits from 
Chambois by capturing and holding the Hills 262, 
252, and 262, Mont Ormel (“Maczuga”).
18 August 1944 – The Diversion of the Group 
Comd (Lt.-Col Koszutski).
Unfortunately the intention of the Div Comd 
failed. It was thwarted by the Group Comd of 2 
Tk Regt. He did not move, but at 0200 hours, 
and moreover in the wrong direction, i.e. not 
in direction Chambois SE, but in direction les 
Champeaux, straight to the E, engaging himself 
in a combat with enemy inf and A Tk weapons 
in a country very difficult for tks.
In the morning Div Comd got the alarming report 
of the threat that 2 Tk Regt and 8 Rifle Bn may be 
destroyed. He ordered the comd of 10 Armd Cav 
Bde to help the group, which he did, detailing 1 
Mountain Rifle Bn.
The Div Comd directed a reconnaissance (10 
Mounted Rifle Regt plus two A Tk Btys) on 
Chambois, which was reached by 1650 hours 
(one kilometre S of Chambois – the first sqn 
of 10 Mtd Rifle Regt) but the regt was forced to 
withdraw 1 kilometre further S in view of the 
bombardment by our own Air Force. 
Leading elements of 10 Armd Cav Bde (10 
Dragoons plus 24 Lancers) reached the area 
333326 at 2030 hours and were engaged in 
hy fighting with enemy inf and A Tk weapons. 
Meanwhile, the 1 Mounted Rifle Bn have not 
found 2 Tk Regt in the area of Les Champeaux. 
The latter at this time was in the area of 428586, 
and asserted that they could not move farther 
because of shortage of supplies (part of their 
transport with amn and petrol was destroyed by 
our own Air Force). 
Owing to incorrect reports, the supplies which 
had been sent by the QM to the area of Bourdon 
(allegedly occupied by 2 Tk Regt) could not reach 
them, as the area was held by the enemy and 2 
Tk Regt occupied it only temporarily.
In these extremely hard conditions began the 
crisis of the battle, which lasted until midday of 
21 Aug. It was caused by:
(a) Desperate efforts of German forces, which 
found themselves in the gap Trun–Chambois–
Coudehard–Ecorches to break through at all 
costs.
(b) Co-operation of the German forces attacking 
from the NE with the aim of enabling the escape 
of German tps trapped in the gap.
(c) Relatively small force – 1 Pol Armd Div – for 
the closing of the gap, as the neighbouring forces 
did not co-operate sufficiently. 
German soldiers being marched into captivity, 16 August 1944.LAC PA 135954
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(d) Cutting off the supply echelons from the 
fighting units, which greatly complicated the 
question of supplies of amn and petrol and the 
evacuation of wounded.
The Capture of Chambois and Maczuga – The 
Fighting for Maczuga with German Forces, 
trying to Break Through.
In this critical situation 10 Armd Cav Bde 
Comd, ordered 1 Tk Regt to attack in direction 
of Bourdon, to enable the supply of Lt.-Col. 
Koszutski’s group. But again this attack could 
not be executed as the Allied Air Force made 
it impossible by shelling the area. The night 
of 18/19 passed with the situation unclear 
concerning the neighbouring forces in Trun. 
According to information received, 4 Cdn Armd 
Div should have taken Trun by 0930 hours, but 
it was not definitely captured until 1315 hours, 
advancing only slightly in the direction of St. 
Lambert. The left neighbour, 3 Cdn Inf Div, was 
relieving 51 (H) Div, which op from St. Pierre-
sur-Dives in direction E.
19 August 1944: The task for the day of 19 
Aug was to attack and capture Chambois and 
“Maczuga”. At 0920 hours the group of Major 
Zgorzelski – 10 Dragoons plus 24 Lancers 
attacked the Hill 137 (420555). At 1200 hours 
after throwing out the German inf, 24 Lancers 
captured the Hill 137, taking a great number of 
prisoners.
10 Dragoons had consolidated on Hill 137 at 
1437 hours. 
24 Lancers adv on the Hill 424544 very slowly, 
owing to the difficult country.
By 1539 hours 1 Tk Regt reported that with all 
their forces, they had taken the area of Coudehard 
and fought heavily with Panthers, being at the 
same time subjected to a strong enemy arty fire.
24 Lancers continued to attack to the S (generally 
on Frenes) losing contact with 10 Dragoons, 
which, advancing, operated on Chambois.
At this time 10 Mounted Rifle Regt plus two A 
Tk Btys SP, which had been acting very efficiently 
as div recce since the morning in direction of 
Chambois, linked up with Major Zgorzelski’s 
group (10 Dragoons).
By 1930 hours 10 Dragoons had captured the 
S outskirts of Chambois, and in heavy hand-
to-hand battles in the suburbs of Chambois, 
captured the whole place, occupying the highway 
exits in the direction of Mont Ormel, and in the 
direction of St. Lambert-sur-Dives linking up 
with American inf.
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Cromwells of 1st Polish Armoured Division 
on the move in Normandy, August 1944.
The regrouping of the units for the night 
according to orders was not accomplished, as 
the group of Lt.-Col. Koszutski had not adv SE, 
but remained where they were.
The disposal was as follows:
The group of Lt.-Col. Koszutski (2 Tk Regt plus 
8 Rifle Bn plus one A Tk Bty) – the Hill 240.
1 Tk Regt plus 1 Mountain Rifle Bn plus one A 
Tk Bty – the hills 262 and 252 (“Maczuga”)
24 Lancers – 1 kilometre E of 113 (4152)
10 Dragoons – Chambois
10 Mounted Rifle Regt – 1 kilometre N of 
Chambois
9 Rifle Bn – in march from 240 on Maczuga.
The whole burden of the battle this day, with a 
superior enemy, (as it was disclosed later units of 
the 1 and 2 SS Corps) was borne by 1 Pol Armd 
Div, which outstripped their neighbouring forces 
in a wedge 6 -7 kilometres SE.
20 August 1944: During the night of 19/20 
Aug, the 10 Mounted Rifle Regt fought very 
courageously with the enemy, who was trying 
to slip out of the trap, attacked several times at 
night.
The battle reached its climax when the Comd of a 
German higher formation, Lt.-Gen. Elfeld, trying 
to break through under the cover of Panthers, 
was taken prisoner with all his staff. At this 
moment the gallant Comd of 10 Mounted Rifle 
Regt – Major Maciejowski – was killed.
During the whole day the enemy attacked the 
1 and 2 Tk Regts from all sides. The attacks 
followed from the W from the gap where the 
German forces were trapped, as well as from 
the E, where probably the 21 Panzer Div, with 
their battlegroups tried to release the trapped 
German forces. The battle closed at a distance 
of 50 metres and the best proof of its fury will 
be evident later in the battlefield Chambois–
Maczuga.
In the area of Bourdon an enemy tk group 
encountered the HQ of 10 Armd Cav Bde, but 
was completely destroyed. The Adv HQ of the 
Comd 10 Armd Cav Bde was moved to Hill 259.
The question of supplies for cut-off regts became 
a big problem, which the blocked roads and 
enemy roaming all over the gap made it difficult 
to solve.
The supply of amn and fuel by means of air 
transport was in preparation, but could be 
carried out only on the morning of 21 Aug. 
An equally big question was the evacuation of 
wounded and prisoners. There was a lack of 
tracked vehicles able to move over all parts of 
the ground.
The crisis was mastered. The units repelled the 
German attack and held the designated posns 
though no help came from 4 Cdn Armd Div, 
which next day only attacked from Hill 240 in the 
S direction, and helped in supplying our units.
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Strong attacks were launched on 24 Lancers from 
the direction of St. Lambert-sur-Dives and later 
on 10 Dragoons in the S outskirts of Chambois. 
It turned out that St. Lambert-sur-Dives was held 
by the enemy, and not by part of 4 Cdn Armd Div 
as was ordered.
24 Lancers co-ordinated its action with 10 
Dragoons by 0815 hours and counter-attacked, 
thus forcing the enemy to withdraw. At this time 
the Americans were approaching from the SW. 
The enemy renewed his attacks and the battle 
raged the whole day, the enemy suffering hy 
losses in eqpt. In the evening the attack declined 
and Major Agorzelski’s group was supplied by 
the Americans with fuel and amn. The wounded 
were conveyed by this group to the Americans. 
21 August 1944: The enemy still tried to 
break through in different directions, but it was 
obvious that the crisis had passed. There were 
no organized actions, but only isolated efforts by 
separate groups.
By 1045 hours the Canadians had linked up 
with 2 Tk Regt, and in the afternoon a whole Cdn 
Bde arrived in the area of 262 Maczuga, bringing 
supplies for the armd regts. The crisis was over.
At 2000 hours the order for regrouping was 
received. It was carried out during the day of 
22 Aug.
22 August 1944: On this day the div Comd got 
the disposal which he had planned for 1500 
hours on the 19 Aug. The disposal is as follows:
The Group of the Comd 3 Rifle Bde:
Composition:
8 and 9 Rifle Bns.
2 Tk Regt.
One A Tk Bty
One Sqn MG.
The area – 262, 252, Coudehard
The task – the defence of area from E and W.
The Group of the Comd 10 Armd Cav Bde:
Composition:
1 Tk Regt
24 Lancers
1 Mountain Rifle Bn
10 Dragoons
One A Tk Bty
The area – Mont Ormel, 262, Chambois
The task – Defence of the area held in the 
direction of E and N and linking up and holding 
contact with the 4 Cdn Armd Div in St Lambert 
sur Dives and with American tps S of Frenes.
The whole arty from the area of Bourdon to 
support either group.
10 Mounted Rifle Regt less one sqn plus two A 
Tk Btys in the area 1 kilometre N of Chambois 
to be a reserve of Div Comd.
One Engr Coy and one sqn of 10 Mounted Rifle 
Regt (tempy) to protect Adv Div HQ (Hill 159). 
Second Engr Coy to sweep the mines, repair the 
roads and organize the crossings.
In the evening 22 Aug with a commendation 
for the action by the Cdn Army Comd, General 
Crerar, arrived an order of change for the div, 
which on the day 23 Aug at 1700 hours passed 
over to the res of Army Comd.
General Characteristics of the Ops
The regrouping of 1 Pol Armd Div on the day of 
13 Aug, aimed at their operational employment 
in harrying the deep rear of the retreating enemy.
The first condition to be fulfilled was the quick 
seizure of crossings over the R Dives. By excellent 
fighting of 10 Mounted Rifle Regt (with one A Tk 
Bty and one sqn of 10 Dragoons) the crossings 
were seized on 16 Aug at Jort and in the morning 
of 17 Aug S of Jort.
Through these crossings the div attacked quickly 
at the designated objectives – the Hills 159 and 
259, and by the afternoon at 1700 hours they 
had already completed their task.
At 1750 hours the Div Comd received personally, 
from the Corps Comd an order from the Army 
Group Comd to attack and seize Chambois that 
same night. At that time also 4 Cdn Armd Div 
was to attack Trun.
The task of attacking Chambois was given to 
Lt.-Col. Koszutski’s group (2 Tk Regt, 8 Rifle Bn 
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and one A Tk Bty), but unfortunately they did 
not reach their destinations, but went astray and 
engaged themselves in battle at les Champeaux.
The leading plan of the Div Comd had been to 
seize Chambois and to bar the E exits by capture 
of the Hills 262 – 252 (Maczuga) and 262 (S of 
Mont Ormel).
As he was not able to get this done by Lt.-Col. 
Koszutski’s group, the Div Comd assigned the 
capture of Chambois to Major Zgorzelski’s 
group (10 Dragoons, 24 Lancers) with which 
were joined 10 Mounted Rifle Regt. This regt 
reconnoitring Chambois early was there engaged 
in battle.
The days of 13-20 and the morning of the 21 Aug, 
saw hy fighting full of glorious deeds of the div 
against German elite tps, namely two SS corps, 
which tried to break through at any cost. 
The greatness of the victory can be measured by 
a review of the battlefields at Chambois, Mont 
Ormel and the Hills 262 and 252, showing the 
triumph of the Polish arms.
The div went through several trials during this op, 
and came out fully victorious. The direct rewards 
were the prisoners and booty as follows:
Prisoners Recorded: up to 23 Aug. – 87 Offrs 
(incl: 1 Lt.-Gen, 4 Cols, 2 Lt.-Cols.) and 3,576 
ORs. Unrecorded: handed over to the Americans 
without receipt when Major Zgorzelski’s group 
was cut off from the div: - 50 offrs and 1,400 ORs, 
handed over by 24 Lancers and 10 Dragoons. 
Total: over 5,000 prisoners.
Booty: Captured and destroyed eqpt – 55 tks 
and armoured vehs, (incl 14 Panthers, 6 Tigers, 
12 Mk IV, 5 Mk III, 2 Mk II), 2 guns SP (88 mm), 
14 armoured cars, 44 guns (various types), 38 
Armoured tracked vehs for tp transport, 207 
Motor vehs, 152 horse-drawn vehicles.
Remarks. The captured eqpt was recorded at 
co-ordinates and gives the result of the last 
three days of the battle (18-21 Aug). The amt 
of capture eqpt is however much larger, but as 
the co-ordinates were not given in the reports of 
the other units they were disregarded. It can be 
estimated that the same amt of eqpt was capture 
in the period 14-18 Aug.
Own Losses
325 killed (incl 21 offr)
1002 wounded (incl 35 offr)
114 missing (incl 00 offr)
Total losses 1,441, with previous 657, total 
2,097, from which: 446 killed (incl 37 offrs), 
150 wounded (incl 92 offrs) and 150 missing 
(incl 5 offrs).
The div obtained during the op the written 
appreciation of Cdn Army Comd, General Crerar, 
and 2 Cdn Corps Comd, General Simonds.
The editors wish to thank John R. Grodzinski 
for his assistance with this feature.
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